In this new book, the authors assert that the Trilateral countries—the United States, Canada, Japan, and the nations of the European Union—have made an inadequate and intermittent commitment of policy toward Russia since 1991. They focus on four broad elements of the long agenda for engaging Russia: European "architecture"—they propose greatly intensified NATO-Russia links and they suggest a managing body drawn from OSCE members; nuclear issues—they urge a much larger effort o assist the Russian government in removing nuclear weapons and fissile materials from present and prospective temptation; Northeast Asia—they contend that in contrast to Europe, Russian power is not a central problem in East Asia and the potential gains from engaging Russia in this region are sometimes overlooked; and support for political and economic reform in Russia—given the stakes involved, they argue, the trilateral countries have done too little to support reform in Russia and the other former Soviet republics.Russia may become a more difficult partner in the years ahead. But unless the Kremlin returns decisively to a path hostile to the West, the authors argue, the depth of the Trilateral countries' interests in this great power will call for the inclusive approach they set out.