This study elucidates the complicated manoeuvres in Mussolini's policy in both Europe and Africa which culminated in the Italian-Ethiopian war of 1935-36. Mr. Robertson deals with Italy's relation with the major and minor powers of Europe, and to some extent to the Near and Far East; his work thus makes an important contribution to a general understanding of the period 1932-36. From a fresh examination of the question whether Mussolini was a mere opportunist or a planner in power-politics, the author concludes that on balance the evidence now available lends considerable support to the view that Mussolini tried to pursue a systematic policy: the conversion of the Mediterranean into Italy's Mare Nostrum. This interpretation differs markedly from those which dismiss the Duce as a sawdust Caesar who need not be taken seriously. Mussolini's realization that Italy was not strong enough to take on either Britain or France singlehanded in the Mediterranean led him to adopt an alternative policy: the disruption of French, and later British, authority in North Africa and the Near East, and the extension of Italian influence in South-East Europe. The collision of German and Italian interests in this area eventually persuaded him that Italy's ambitions should be realized in East Africa. The author describes how the Duce was often at variance with his political and military advisers, among whom there was constant intrigue and jockeying for position. As a result, Italian preparations for war with Ethiopia made little progress until early in 1935. Of central importance to his policy, in both Europe and Africa, was the role of Germany under Hitler. Mr. Robertson shows how, despite clashes of national interest (especially over Austria) and significant divergences between Fascist and National socialist ideologies, the personal links between the two dictators proved so strong that after many fluctuations, Mussolini abandoned a policy of 'equidistance', or balance of power, in Europe in favor of that fatal partnership with Germany, the 'Rome-Berlin Axis'.